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Abstract  
 
Throughout its Republican history, Turkey has attempted to formulate a ―non-
interventionist‖ foreign policy toward its neighbouring countries. Since the onset of the 
Arab Uprisings, however, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has abjured 
the traditional policy of ―non-military engagement‖, adopting instead an assertive and 
security-oriented foreign policy that has paved the way for the securitization of the 
Syrian conflict in terms of its Kurdish component and of wider geopolitical aspects. 
This article aims to explore why and in what ways this abrupt shift toward 
securitization has occurred while discussing its broader implications on Turkish 
domestic politics as well.  
Using the Copenhagen School‘s securitization theory, the article will unpack and 
analyse the internal and external dimensions of threat construction and otherization 
processes underlying Ankara‘s securitization policy toward Syria to make the case for 
the obsolescence of Turkey‘s traditional non-interventionist policy, which, we argue, 
results from an ontological insecurity approach toward the Syrian conflict. The article 
finds that Turkey‘s securitization policy (i.e. interventionist approach) was chiefly 
driven by the fear of Kurdish autonomy and the growing Russo-Assad-Iranian alliance 
in Syria; and by the grand ambition of bringing the Muslim Brotherhood into power in 
Syria and consolidating Turkey‘s agential importance in Western security architecture 
under the aegis of the US.  
 
Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Syrian Civil War, AKP, Securitization Theory, Kurdish 
Issue 
 
Introduction    
 
Since its establishment in 1923, the Republic of Turkey has sought to formulate and pursue a 
―non-interventionist‖ foreign policy toward its neighbouring countries (Özpek and Demirağ 
2014; Demirtaş-Bagdonas 2014; Dinc and Yetim 2012; Khan 2015; Volk 2013). Prior to the 
outbreak of the Arab Uprisings and of the Syrian Civil War, there were two major deviations 
from the self-proclaimed non-interventionist policy. By virtue of invoking Article 51 (self-
defence) of the UN Charter, Turkey launched unilateral military interventions in Cyprus in 
1974 and in northern Iraq in 2007-2008 (Ruys 2008; Demirtaş-Bagdonas 2014).1 The third 
case of deviation from the policy, as this article argues, concerns Ankara‘s military incursion 
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into Syria dubbed the ―Operation Euphrates Shield‖ (24 August 2016 – 29 March 2017), 
followed by another military operation code-named the ―Olive Branch Operation‖ in Syria's 
Afrin region (20 January – 24 March 2018). 
According to Turkish officials, the primary objectives of both operations were to 
counter the Islamic State (IS) insurgency near Turkish borders and, in the case of the latter 
operation, neutralize the Syrian affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Afrin 
canton. The Euphrates Shield Operation was particularly significant in that it not only marked 
the Turkey‘s renunciation of the non-military engagement policy toward neighbouring 
countries, but also proved to be a prelude to a new securitization phase in which the AKP 
(Justice and Development Party) elites would take matters into their own hands in dealing 
with the Syrian conflict.  
From the outset of the Arab Uprisings, the conflict in Syria presented the ruling AKP 
with countless opportunities and challenges. Most notably, the power vacuum created in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings along 
with the seismic socio-political transformations gripping the region, posed formidable 
challenges to the AKP‘s traditional prudent and pragmatic approach toward MENA countries. 
We argue that Turkish political elites have since 2011 departed from the doctrine of Strategic 
Depth, as articulated by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and shifted toward an 
assertive foreign policy that amounts to securitization of the Syrian issue in terms of its 
Kurdish component and of wider geopolitical aspects.  
In this context, an important question arises as to why there has been a volte-face in 
Turkish foreign policy in the sense that the traditional principles of ―zero problems with 
neighbours‖ were replaced by the policy of securitization as evidenced by Turkish military 
interventions in northern Syria and quite recently in northern Iraq. There has been a plethora 
of literature addressing the continuities and changes in Turkey-Syria relations in the context 
of the AKP government‘s post-Arab Uprisings policies toward the Middle East in general and 
toward the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in particular. Nevertheless, as of the 
writing this article, the Copenhagen School‘s securitization theory has seldom been used to 
shed light on the dynamics of threat construction and threat management in Turkey-Syria 
relations since the war started.
2
  
On this basis, this article will employ a two-pronged analytical framework to 
foreground and analyse the securitization processes underpinning the AKP-led securitization 
policy toward the Syrian conflict while looking at its potential implications on domestic 
politics. The first prong will focus on internal dimensions of threat construction and 
otherization underlying Turkey‘s deep-seated fear of Kurdish statehood project, as 
exemplified by the PKK‘s fight against Turkey since 1984. The second prong highlights the 
external dimensions of threat construction and otherization with a focus on the AKP elites‘ 
aspiration of toppling the Assad regime, bringing the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood into power 
and balancing the power of rivalling states, namely Iran and Russia. It bears noting that the 
dynamics of Turkey-Russia-Iran relations have changed significantly since the Astana peace 
process unfolded in 2017 and the trio alliance began to perceive the US presence in Syria as a 
strategic burden. Nevertheless, for Turkey, the initial impetus to enter the Syrian war was to 
carve out a dominant role vis-à-vis Iran and Russia in the geopolitical power struggle. 
New Middle Eastern Studies, 8 (1) 
44 
 
Seen in this light, the article unfolds in four parts. The first part attends to the main 
tenets of the securitization theory, followed by a study of its relevance to the case of Turkey‘s 
policy detour toward Syria. The second section examines the patterns of divergence and 
convergence in Turkey-Syria relations from the dispute on the status of Hatay in 1939 to the 
outbreak of Syrian civil war in 2011. The third section will then apply the theory to the 
current case (Turkey‘s military operation in northern Syria) and operationalize it based on the 
two-pronged analytical framework mentioned above. Finally, the concluding part will allude 
to the potential achievements and deficiencies of securitization efforts made by the AKP and 
its implications on the future of Turkish domestic and foreign policy.   
 
Securitization as the Theoretical Framework 
 
Securitization theory, as formulated by leading scholars within the Copenhagen School of 
Security Studies deals with how security works in international politics. Originally conceived 
as a critique of the traditionalists‘ ―narrow definition of security‖, securitization theory 
provides a powerful lens through which one can make sense of the broader meanings and 
wider applications of security in world politics.  
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the traditionalists had dominated the security debates, 
arguing that state-centric approaches to world politics that largely focus on military issues 
should be the research agenda of International Security Studies (ISS) (Booth 2003: 83-120). 
In the mid-1990s, however, those military and state-centric conceptions of security were 
seriously challenged by leading scholars of post-Cold War international security studies who 
began to pose thoughtful questions as to ―what should be the research agenda of ISS, which 
concept of security should be employed and which epistemology should be adopted in its 
study‖ (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 162). Such critical approaches were concerned with 
broadening and deepening the scope of the field to move beyond traditionalist‘s view of 
military and state (Krause and Williams 1996: 230). Hence, those advocating for broadening 
of security agenda argued that the concept of security should cover other sectors than the 
military and thereby ―include a wider range of potential threats, ranging from economic and 
environmental issues to human rights and migration‖ (ibid; Buzan and Hansen 2009: 188).  
Those advocating for deepening the agenda of security studies asserted that the referent 
object of security should move beyond the state and include the security concerns of actors 
ranging from individuals and sub-state groups (Williams 2003: 513). Such was the scholarly 
environment in which the Copenhagen School approach flourished with prominent 
securitization theory scholars paying attention to social construction of security issues and the 
discursive construction of particular issues as security threats (McDonald 2008: 563). Hence, 
securitization theory emerged as an alternative approach to explaining and understanding 
security concerns as it sought to throw light on dynamics such as ―social reality,‖ ―identity,‖ 
―speech act,‖ and intersubjective construction of security threats.  
There are myriad ways to define what securitization is and what analytical advantage it 
has in explaining state behaviour. Yet, as one scholar puts it, securitization is the process 
through which ―security‖ and ―security threats‖ are brought into being in particular political 
contexts (ibid). More specifically, securitization theory delves into the processes by which ―a 
securitizing actor succeeds in presenting a threat or vulnerability as an existential threat to a 
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referent object that has a legitimate claim to survival, thereby attaining endorsement for 
emergency measures‖ to counter it (Oelsner 2007: 261). According to Buzan, Wæver and 
Wilde, the theory seeks to provide a thorough understanding of ―who securitizes, on what 
issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under 
what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful‖ (Buzan et al. 2013). 
Hence, the proponents of the theory look at different ways in which a particular issue is 
plucked out of the realm of ―normal politics‖ and hurled into the sphere of ―emergency 
politics,‖ where it can be framed in terms of security, thereby creating conditions of 
possibility for using whatever means necessary to forestall a threatening development and 
safeguard the referent object in question.  
In a nutshell, securitization theory ―combines the politics of threat design with that of 
threat management‖ (Balzacq et al. 2016). The novelty of securitization theory lies in its 
distinctive framework for understanding of security as an intersubjective social process and 
the particular ways in which securitizing agents use language and even non-verbal means of 
communication to construct security threats in a specific context and handle them 
accordingly. This strand of thought elucidates how ―securitizing moves‖ as well as 
emergency measures aimed at countering the perceived threat and protecting the valued 
referent object tend to be justified through the governing system‘s intertextual and discursive 
strategies so that the audience can concur with the grand hegemonic discourse at play. 
Although the Copenhagen School approach to securitization has seen a proliferation of 
empirical usage in recent years, it also has been subject to scholarly criticism. In this regard, 
the so-called ―second-generation securitization theorists‖ have endeavoured to build upon the 
exiting paradigm and fill in the potential gaps in theory and practice of securitization by 
raising salient questions about, inter alia, the role of audience, securitizations in non-
democratic contexts, overemphasis on the notion of speech-act, and the role of images, etc. 
(Stritzel 2014: 11). Needless to say, the scope and aim of this article is not to ruminate on the 
critique of securitization theory. Alternatively, key here is the potential relevance of the 
theory to the case of Turkey‘s change of behaviour in the Middle East after the Syrian civil 
war.  
We argue that what makes securitization theory a plausible fit for analysing the present 
case is two-fold. First, using a security-laden discourse, the AKP elites went to great lengths 
to present the Alawite-dominated government of Assad as an existential threat to Turkey‘s 
national security, thereby taking emergency measures, even if militarily, to counter the 
security threat. Turkey‘s military interventions in Syria, namely the Euphrates Shield 
Operation, can thus be seen as a principal securitizing move to prevent the Assad regime 
from gravitating more toward other rivalling geopolitical players (i.e. Russia and Iran) and if 
possibly replace his regime with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Second, the AKP cadre 
used any means at its disposal to frame the Kurdish issue as an existential threat born of 
Assad‘s mishandling of the Syrian civil war which, in Ankara‘s view, only exacerbated the 
Kurdish quasi-state-building ambitions in northern Syria. Thus, the urgency of removing the 
Kurdish statehood threat was apparently more pronounced than the one posed by the Islamic 
State. The assertion here is that Turkey‘s interventionist policy in Syria was largely driven by 
two insecurities, namely the fear of Kurdish statehood/the Russo-Iranian alliance (all players 
being cast out as the Other) and two ambitions, notably bringing the Syrian Muslim 
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Brotherhood in power and consolidating Turkey‘s position in Western security architecture. 
Of particular importance here is that all these insecurities and ambitions were in fact building 
blocks of deeper securitization practices which the AKP used to justify Turkey‘s 
interventionist policy towards Syria. 
In shedding light on its premises, this study first builds on the discussion using the 
secondary literature, such as the context material and scholarly works focusing on the 
continuities and ruptures in Turkey and Syria prior to the Arab Spring. Then, it advances the 
dialogue by utilizing primary sources, i.e. Turkish officials‘ speeches, newspaper articles and 
legal documents. The main rationale behind these data selections is to demonstrate how and 
in which ways the securitizing actor, the AKP elites, discursively constructed and 
disseminated their ―internal‖ and ―external‖ security concerns vis-à-vis the multiple 
―Other(s)‖, various Kurdish-armed groups and the Assad regime, operating in the Syrian 
Civil War. This conventional discourse analysis method, which has been embedded into 
securitization theory, will help us show the radical securitizing moves and their leverages on 
the changing traditional ―zero problems with neighbours‖ policy to the full-scale 
securitization.  
Before we proceed with a comprehensive discussion of the foregoing issues, it is 
imperative that we put Turkey-Syria relations in historical context and identify patterns of 
securitization and desecuritization in bilateral ties. 
 
Continuities and Ruptures in Turkey-Syria Relations 
 
To be sure, any attempt at analysing Turkey-Syria relations requires a balanced scrutiny of 
the historical evolution of bilateral ties. Turkey and Syria have had a chequered relationship 
since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent establishment of the 
Republican state (Aras and Köni 2002: 47-60). The history of relations between Turkey and 
Syria is marked by periods of intense enmity in the 1950s and of rapprochement in early and 
mid-2000s, relapsing again into a state of total breakdown since the outbreak of the 2011 
Syrian civil war. To be more specific, Turkey-Syria relations can best be pared down into 
three distinct phases: 
In the first period (1939-1998), which lasted roughly from the eve of World War II to 
the signing of Adana Accord between Ankara and Damascus, three overarching disputes 
brought the two nations to the brink of war. The first cause of belligerence related to an 
irreconcilable territorial dispute over Turkish southern province of Hatay – which was part of 
Syria until France decided to hand it over to Turkey in 1939. The annexation of Hatay 
province put a considerable strain on the collective memory of the Syrians. As some scholars 
argue, a groundswell of Ba‘athist sentiments developed in Syria following the loss of Hatay 
as large numbers of Arab Alawites who had left Hatay decided to join the Ba‘ath Party (Islam 
2016: 14; Jørum 2014: 146).  
The second polemical issue pertains to the apportionment of the water resources of the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin with Syria as the downstream riparian state censuring Turkey for 
its water management policies. According to Kibaroğlu, water came to Turkish foreign policy 
radar in the early 1980s as a series of large-scale dams and giant irrigation projects were 
constructed in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin as part of the South-Eastern Anatolia 
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Development Project (Kibaroğlu 2015: 154). Yet, given that some 75 percent of the entire 
basin originates in Turkey, Damascus demands an equal allocation of water for continuation 
of its agriculture-based development programs. Notwithstanding the divergent perspectives 
and the legal complexities of the ongoing water dispute, there are very few reasons to be 
optimistic about possible desecuritization of the water problem at this stage.  
In fact, the prospects of a positive change in the two countries‘ approach look decidedly 
unpromising as Syria has since the late 1990s resorted to terrorist activities against Turkey in 
order to win concessions in the dispute. This brings us to the third source of tension between 
Turkey and Syria—that is Syrian support for the separatist PKK. In essence, the Kurdish 
issue has been predominantly viewed as one of the most heavily securitized issues in 
domestic politics with strong implications on Turkey‘s external relations as well (Aras and 
Karakaya Polat 2008: 499). The Kurdish quest for statehood, against the backdrop of 
Turkey‘s three-decade old struggle with the PKK, has become an indispensable vector of the 
AKP-led securitizing policy and a recurrent theme in its repertoire of the security discourse 
employed by Turkey‘s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Founded in 1978 by Abdullah 
Öcalan, the PKK has been listed by Turkey as a terrorist organization. The AKP cadre sees 
the PKK activities and its separatist creed as the foremost existential threat to Turkey‘s 
territorial integrity and national security (Ünal 2016: 91-125). The framing of the Kurdish 
issue and the PKK violence as a security threat is supported by Article 2 of Law No. 2945 on 
National Security Council (MGK 2013).  
In hindsight, the politics of threat design was further buttressed by that of threat 
management under Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel governments. Both governments took 
a range of extraordinary measures up until 1999 in the form of, inter alia, cross-border 
operations into northern Iraq to protect the state against the PKK threat (Pusane 2014: 84). It 
was in this period that the Syria-Turkey relations took a turn for the worse when Turkey 
accused the then Syrian President Hafez Assad of providing safe havens to Öcalan and PKK 
rebels and of using the Kurdish separatist activities as a leverage against Turkey regarding the 
waterway issue. Mention must be made that the ―Syrian Military Offensive Plan‖ to destroy 
Turkish dams was leaked also in this period, although Turkey disregarded it as a bogus threat 
(Allan 2000: 73). Consequently, by invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, or the resort to 
self-defence, Turkey threatened Damascus with military action in the event of the latter‘s 
refusal to expel him from Syria. As can be seen, Turkey did not pursue an interventionist 
agenda against Syria during this period and rather adhered to provisions of international law 
to avoid a further escalation of tensions with Syria (Demirtaş-Bagdonas 2014: 141). The 
searing antagonism and tit-for-tat retaliatory behaviour dominating Turkey-Syria relations 
died down following the signing of the Adana Accord in 1998, which ushered in a brief 
period of détente in bilateral relations (Aras 2011: 601). 
In the second period between 1998 and 2011, Turkey and Syria entered into a 
desecuritization phase owing to the signing of the Adana Accord, the subsequent termination 
of logistical, financial, and military aids to the PKK by the then Syrian government, as well 
as Hafez Assad‘s death in 2000. As Demirtaş-Bagdonas observes, the ensuing post-Adana 
Accord transformations augured well for enhancement of Turkey‘s initially security-oriented 
cooperation toward a more comprehensive partnership on economic, political and cultural 
fronts (Demirtaş-Bagdonas 2014: 141). From a vantage point, the gradual shift away from 
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military and security-oriented Turkish foreign policy at the top echelon of power took place 
after the end of the Cold War. It also occurred as a corollary of a constellation of substantial 
socio-economic and political transformations unfolding under the leadership of Turgut Özal 
and Süleyman Demirel, who sought to redefine Turkey‘s position as a leading actor in the 
post-Cold War era (Yalvaç 2016: 13; Grigoriadis 2014: 159-60). Özal‘s policy of 
rapprochement with the Arab countries, his promulgation of free-market economy and 
support for US policies in the Middle East, Caucasia and Central Asia, and pursuant of 
détente with the Soviet Union via trade and economic deals can be seen as good examples in 
this respect (Bertrand 2013: 68; Aral 2010: 72). 
What deserves attention is that Özal, first as prime minister (1983–89) and then as 
president (1989–93), had no scruples about rejecting Turkey‘s traditional policy of non-
interference in Middle East disputes chiefly because he wanted to pursue a proactive and risk-
taking foreign policy in the face of regional security challenges (Altunışık 2009: 179). 
Therefore, Özal pushed for involvement in the First Gulf War in order to elevate Turkey‘s 
role as an anchor of Western security and strategic interests. This unorthodox detour from the 
longstanding policy of non-involvement was apparently a turning point in Turkey‘s foreign 
policy direction. It was a remarkable shift in the sense that with the Soviet threat almost 
obliterated after the Cold War, Turkey had found itself in a state of identity crisis because 
NATO as a vital ―Western component‖ of Turkish identity was about to lose its raison d'etre 
(Yanık 2011: 83). Hence, by adopting a pro-American foreign policy as exemplified in the 
case of the Turkey‘s involvement in the Gulf War, Ankara launched a new activism in its 
foreign policy (ibid; Markovsky 1999). Despite the new activism, as Yalvaç reckons, ―Özal‘s 
neoliberal hegemonic project‖ was dealt a devastating blow due in part to the economic crises 
of 1994, 2000, and 2001 (Yalvaç 2016: 14).  
Moreover, the victory of the Islamic Welfare Party (RP, Refah Partisi) in the 1995 
general elections had titled the balance of power in Turkish politics toward the pro-Islamic 
factions. These factions promoted ―a foreign policy vision centred on a binary, identity-based 
worldview: the West and the Muslim world were in opposition‖ (Dalay and Friedman 2013: 
124). Seen in this light, the Welfare Party under the newly elected Prime Minister Necmettin 
Erbakan sought to establish closer ties to Muslim countries (i.e. Syria), instead of deepening 
Turkey‘s relations with the EU. This is the context in which to make sense of the root causes 
of the normalization of Turkey-Syria relations in 1998. A year later, however, Turkey was 
granted candidate country status by the EU, a turning point in Turkish foreign policy in that, 
as Bilgin argues, it afforded other societal and political actors an opportunity to ―frame other 
issues as ‗threats to Turkey‘s future‘‖ (Bilgin 2007: 555). In this setting, Turkey-Syria 
relations was gradually becoming desecuritized as Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
attended the funeral of Hafez Assad in an unprecedented move that helped the then Syrian 
government break international isolation after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafik al-Hariri.  
Turkey‘s quest for becoming a leading regional and global actor went into overdrive 
after the AKP came to power in November 2002. Dubbed as the visionary architect of the 
AKP‘s foreign policy, former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu envisioned a new global 
agenda on the basis of Turkey‘s exceptional geographical and historical characteristics. He 
defined these characteristics as ―depths‖ to be explored or strategic advantages that must be 
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utilized to reconfigure Turkey‘s position in the changing global order. The new Turkish 
geopolitical weltanschauung sought to promote a synthesis of Islam, democracy and free 
market values while at the same time retaining Turkey‘s secular constitutional structure 
(Keyman 2010: 12). Similar to Özal‘s vision, the AKP government launched a new phase of 
Turkish foreign policy activism economically predicated on a neoliberalist doctrine and 
politically beholden to its institutional and functional ties and commitments to NATO in the 
post-Cold War era. Unlike Özal, however, Davutoğlu rebuked, at least in principle, any 
liminal representations of Turkey ―as a torn society, straddling Europe and Asia, in-between 
the West and the Muslim world‖, positing that such a role ―embodies passivity and dilutes 
Turkey‘s central position in the Middle East‖ (Rumelili 2012: 505; Altunışık 2009: 186). 
Furthermore, the ideological components of the AKP‘s Strategic Depth doctrine outweighed 
its ideational underpinnings largely associated with the idea of Turkishness – a concept which 
was integral to the theory and practice of Özal‘s foreign policy (e.g. Turkey‘s relations with 
Central Asian countries). 
Looking at the ideational and discursive foundations of the AKP‘s Strategic Depth 
doctrine, one can identify a particular civilizational narrative which is derivative of an 
Ottoman Islamist understanding of (Turkish) identity that forms the basis of the AKP‘s 
broader project of ―Sunni-fication‖ in the Middle East (Hintz 2016: 346; Ardıç 2014: 101-
122). Key here is whereas Turk-ification constituted the central narrative of the early 
Republican era, the AKP‘s search for a ―new subjectivity‖ required it to construct and 
interpolate a ―Modern,‖ ―Medium,‖ and ―Muslim‖ image of itself and thereby set a model for 
other players in the region to follow (Tezcür 2010: 1-19). For this to happen, the AKP elites 
continue to underscore Turkey‘s ―Westernness‖ through identification with key organizations 
like NATO and European institutions like the EU.  
At the regional level, the Strategic Depth doctrine was somewhat designed to replicate 
for Turkey the Ottoman era‘s peaceful relations with the Muslim neighbours and enhance 
strategic, economic, and security partnership with them (Bilgin and Bilgiç 2011: 191; Aygül 
2014: 405). As Davutoğlu notes, for Turkey to be able to shape regional power dynamics, it 
is imperative that the existential security threats in the Middle East are dealt with in an 
effective and peaceful manner (Hintz 2016: 335-361). Hence, by exploiting its exceptional 
geographical and historical depth as well as the soft power elements of its foreign policy, 
Turkey tried to become a leading regional actor tasked with removing regional security 
threats and mediating inter-state conflicts. It is this context that the central tenets of 
Davutoğlu‘s foreign policy manifesto, including ―Zero Problems with Neighbours‖, ―Multi-
dimensional foreign policy‖, and ―Rhythmic Diplomacy‖ found meaning. As some scholars 
believe, Davutoğlu ‗s doctrine was premised on ―what he called ‗normalization‘ and ‗de-
securitization‘ of Turkish foreign policy by changing the security perceptions of the country 
embedded in its political culture‖ (Kara and Sözen 2016: 55). This foreign policy paradigm 
showed itself in Turkey‘s conciliatory attitude toward Syria following the signing of the 
Adana Agreement. The accord served as a catalyst that helped the two countries resolve their 
disputes on water issues and the activities of the PKK. The desecuritization in Turkey-Syria 
relations was also due in part to the diminishing of Turkey‘s threat perceptions toward the 
Kurds and the kind of strategic environment that dominated the Middle East region in the 
aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War. The Strategic Depth doctrine of the AKP elite thus catapulted 
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the Turkey-Syria relations to a new height as a range of partnership agreements were signed 
between Ankara and Damascus on various areas such as free trade, bilateral military 
cooperation and lifting of visa. This level of unprecedented cooperation demonstrated, above 
all, the effectiveness of Davutoğlu‘s policy of zero problems with neighbours (Davutoğlu 
2008: 77-96). 
In the third period (2011-present), Turkey-Syria relations are fraught with uncertainty 
and enmity. Syria-Turkey relations had improved steadily up until the outbreak of the Arab 
Uprisings. Prior to the tectonic socio-political upheavals of 2011, the AKP appeared to be 
content about the expansion of Turkey‘s sphere of influence in the region both economically 
and normatively. Most notably, due to the fact that Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood 
groups had occupied key governmental positions in Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, there was a 
clear sense of complacency among the AKP‘s leading cadre about the success of the so-called 
Turkish model in the region (Öniş 2014: 203-219). In contrast, the situation in Syria proved 
to be different. The Arab revolts in the North Saharan countries first came as a bless in 
disguise for Turkey, primarily because it afforded Ankara an unique opportunity to shift the 
balance of power in its favour by promoting the Turkish model as well as the ideology of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (Ayata 2015: 110). Nevertheless, Assad‘s defiance of Turkey‘s 
calls for cessation of hostilities and introducing democratic reforms was seen as an affront to 
Turkey whose détente with Syria in the past was praised as the success story of Strategic 
Depth doctrine. From 2011 to 2016, however, Turkey‘s foreign and security policy was 
characterized and even more so marred by the AKP government‘s erratic shift from 
preserving its doctrine toward pursuing an interventionist policy which eventually motivated 
Turkey to adopt a securitization policy toward the Syrian conflict.  
Having discussed the recurring vicissitudes in Turkey-Syria relations, the next section 
will apply Copenhagen School‘s securitization theory to analyse Ankara‘s sudden detour 
from the traditional non-military engagement policy in the third period.  
 
The Securitization Factor in Turkey’s Foreign Policy Shift in Syria 
 
As mentioned previously, the Arab revolts in 2011 and the unexpected demise of several 
dictatorial regimes in the MENA region generated profound dilemmas for Turkish Middle 
East policy in general and the ―Strategic Depth‖ doctrine in particular. It was a dilemma of 
geopolitical (realpolitik) and of normative (ethics) nature in the first place. On the one hand, 
promoting the Turkish model narrative and siding with the region‘s pro-democracy 
movements against authoritarian regimes pushed the AKP elites to take on a robust (foreign 
policy) activism while anything less than that would have rendered Turkey‘s normative 
appeal as questionable. On the other hand, the foreign policy activism would have failed 
miserably had the ruling establishment not taken into account the context-specific 
complexities of MENA region in socio-political, cultural, and historical terms. The AKP 
leadership‘s overconfident foreign policy, which undoubtedly was rooted in the success of 
Davutoglu‘s doctrine from 2002 to 2009, witnessed a crucial moral test – first in Libya and 
then in Syria. Having won a clear majority of seats in the parliamentary elections of 12 June 
2011, the AKP elites tried to exploit the election victory. As such, they translated it into the 
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popular backing of their regional agendas and used it as a legitimizing tool to expand their 
normative influence on the troubled MENA countries.  
In this context, while cautiously accruing geopolitical gains from the security vacuum 
left by the Obama administration‘s desire to ―disengage‖ from the Middle East, Turkey 
decided to play the role of a mediator and a regional normative power, urging the MENA 
region‘s leaders to adhere to core values and norms relating to democracy, human rights, 
social justice. Prior to the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, almost all authoritarian leaders such 
as the then-Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi 
were deposed either by means of peaceful protests or through military interventions. This 
implied that with autocrats leaving office there were no particular existential threat (related to 
the Arab Uprisings) left to be countered with utmost urgency.  
In this climate of rapid normative and geopolitical transformations, the AKP exploited 
the situation to enhance cross-border cooperation between Turkey and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the region while simultaneously striving not to deviate from its foreign policy 
principle of ―non-military engagement‖ (Özpek and Demiraǧ 2014: 334-39). However, 
beginning in March 2011 when the Syrian popular protest unfolded, the ―brotherhood 
discourse‖ and norm-based narratives of change gradually gave way to the discourse of 
danger and threat. The initial assumption was that owing to the successful desecuritization 
efforts undertaken by Turkey and Syria during the 2000s, Assad would either implement 
those reforms that Syrian protesters and opposition groups demanded from him or would 
relinquish power under the international pressure. Assad‘s defiance accompanied by the 
killing of demonstrators by security forces in cities of Daraa and later in Homs in April 2011 
reignited securitization narratives that had in previous decades overshadowed Turkey-Syria 
relations. Notwithstanding the prevalent rhetoric of ―Assad must go‖, Turkish pro-
government newspapers such as Star and Yeni Şafak framed the ensuing events as a 
―massacre‖ and sought to influence the public perceptions of Assad in different ways so as to 
make the case for legitimization of a Libya-style intervention in Syria (Tür and Kumra 2016: 
119). 
In parallel with a slow erosion of trust and amity between Turkey and Syria, the 
discourse of danger and threat perceptions toward the Syrian regime reigned supreme, 
particularly as a result of three pivotal events in the summer of 2012: (a) the downing of a 
Turkish military jet by Syrian forces, (b) the Syrian regime‘s transfer of control over the 
northern Kurdish regions to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), an offshoot of the PKK, and 
(c) the continued Syrian military strikes and range of tit-for-tat attacks close to Turkey-Syria 
border (Daoudy 2016: 1085; Çakmak 2016: 708). Consequently, Turkey shifted toward an 
assertive foreign policy that led to a puzzling and dangerous securitization of the Syrian 
conflict. Therefore, the Turkish military intervention in northern Syria dubbed ―Euphrates 
Shield Operation‖ (August 2016-March 2017) is considered a securitizing move that ran 
counter to Ankara‘s traditional policy of non-involvement and the soft-power based ―zero 
problems with neighbours‖ principle. As this article argues, the grand securitization in 
question consisted of threat construction and otherization practices with both internal and 
external dimensions. 
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The internal dimension: the evil trio of PKK-PYD-Assad 
 
The perceived threat of Kurdish statehood in northern Syria where the PYD has already 
gained de facto autonomy (Rojava, or Western Kurdistan) permeated forcefully into the 
security discourse and practices of the AKP government. The threat was seen as the malign 
side effect of the weakening of the Syrian government triggering a resurgence of the Kurdish 
minority groups harbouring geopolitical ambitions to advance their causes of self-
determination from Kobane to Afrin (Romano 2015: 53-63). The AKP government has 
invariably been critical of the spillover effects of the Syria war, arguing that it could trigger a 
PKK-linked Kurdish separatist movement inside Turkey since the border regions are 
populated predominantly by Kurds. Hence, despite the previous desecuritization efforts made 
in 2009 and 2013 under the Kurdish Opening I and II initiatives, a renewed process of threat 
construction and otherization was set in motion whereby the Kurdish issue became highly 
securitized.  
Before we venture ahead with the core argument in this section, it merits noting that 
according to Weiss‘s typology, Turkey‘s approach toward the Kurdish issue can be divided 
into three periods: ―(1) a securitization from the founding of the republic and approximately 
the late 1990s; (2) a de-securitization phase extending from approximately 2000 to 2009; (3) 
a re-securitization phase, which has unfolded over the last several years‖ (Weiss 2016: 570). 
The latter phase, we argue, was marked by four pivotal developments which had significant 
implications for Turkey‘s foreign and security policy, and its domestic politics alike. Above 
all, these developments enabled the politics of threat design and threat management, thus 
securitization, as adopted by the AKP elites toward the Syrian issue and the Kurdish problem. 
The very first development relates to the unilateral establishment in November 2013 of 
the Rojava transformational administration governing the three self-proclaimed cantons of 
Afrin, Kobane and Jazira in northern parts of Syria. Interesting to note is that the creation of 
the interim rule in northern Syria came on the heels of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process 
(Kurdish Opening II). As a result, the Rojava factor not only came as a severe blow to the 
ongoing peace talks, it also stymied all AKP efforts to prevent the PKK-affiliated PYD from 
gaining ideological and political foothold in the major border towns in Syria. Hence, the 
security discourse of the AKP began to focus on Assad‘s cooperation with the PYD and the 
dangers of the so-called ―devil triangle‖ consisting PKK-PYD-Assad. Using the rhetoric of 
existential threat and of ―othering‖ in their references to Assad and the PYD, the state-run 
media revived the ―old enemies‖ perceptions about Syria and the PKK. In fact, by associating 
Syria with terrorism and likening Assad to Slobodan Milošević, the former President of 
Yugoslavia, a new social reality was constructed so as to convince the populace that terrorist 
groups backed by the Syrian government were posing a security threat to Turkey.  
The second and third salient developments that arguably contributed to Turkey‘s 
securitization of Syrian conflict concern the Islamic State‘s siege of Kobane (September 2014 
to January 2015) and the PYD‘s capturing of the town of Tal Abyad from the IS in June 
2015, respectively. Both incidents are significant for our understanding of Turkey‘s 
incremental changes in its Syrian policy because they pushed Ankara toward adoption of a 
full-fledged securitization narrative from mid-2015 onwards (Okyay 2017: 837). Above all, 
they solidified the Syrian Kurds‘ nationalistic sentiments and consequently strengthened 
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Turkey‘s perception of security threats. The battle to reclaim the Syrian city of Kobane from 
the IS was not merely a territorial gain. More than anything else, it was a nationalist gain. 
When the images of the bravery of the Kurdish forces of the People‘s Protection Units (YPG) 
and its female soldiers (YPJ) were displayed on various media outlets all around the world, 
the AKP government feared that the Syrian Kurds‘ struggle might generate a robust 
nationalist mobilization among Kurds inside Turkey. The threat of Kurdish nationalism was 
so existential that former Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan stated that ―the issue of 
Kobane and the protests it was generating in the country was ‗a problem that threatens 
Turkey‘s union‘‖ (Thornton 2015: 875). 
The worst-case scenario for Turkey unfolded in mid-June 2015 when the YPG forces 
gained control of the strategically important town of Tal Abyad from the IS militants. Owing 
to the American air support and intelligence sharing, the YPG found a unique opportunity to 
use the border town to link Kobane to Jazira canton in the north-eastern Syrian province of 
Hasakeh. As one scholar notes, on the one hand the YPG‘s strategic victory ―enhanced the 
territorial visibility of a potential future Kurdish mini-state in northern Syria, while on the 
other hand, it fuelled the general perceptions about foreign-backed conspiracy to partition 
Turkey‖ (Weiss 2016: 581). In response to PYD/YPG‘s growing influence in northern Syria 
along Turkish borders, Davutoğlu suggested a direct military intervention, a securitizing 
move which was a direct result of the securitization of Syrian conflict in general. The July 
2015 suicide bombing at a Kurdish cultural centre in the Turkish border town of Suruç put 
the final nail in the coffin of the two-year cease-fire between the Turkish government and the 
Kurdish militants. For Ankara, the Suruç bombing was the last straw in their fight against 
terrorism whereas Kurds saw it as a vindication of Turkey‘s apathy toward the Kurdish plight 
at the hand of the IS, very much similar to what happened to them in Kobane.  
Consequently, two alternative securitizing measures were taken by Ankara, shorn of 
direct military intervention, to protect the Turkish state as the referent object of security 
against the threat of terrorism posed by the YPG and IS. In the first move, Turkish authorities 
allowed the US for the first time to use its İncirlik air base in the southern city of Adana to 
launch military strikes against the IS positions. Next, under the pretext of combating the IS 
terrorists, Turkish fighter jets targeted PKK-affiliated YPG militias in northern Syria who are 
part of the American-led coalition fighting the IS (Gunter 2016: 82). Simultaneously, the 
AKP government continued its sectarian policy as reflected in the Syrian civil war through its 
support for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other military groups such as the former al 
Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, now commonly referred to as Tahrir al-Sham) fighting 
Assad and his supporters. It is essential to indicate that during the Euphrates Shield Operation 
the Turkish leaders employed a securitization discourse according to which the IS threat was 
treated in the same way and with the same urgency as the one posed by the PYD. Erdoğan 
himself stated in March 2017 that ―Turkey is a country that has been battling terrorism for 35 
years and now it faces a threat from such groups as ISIS, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), 
the People‘s Protection Units (YPG) and Jabhat al-Nusra‖ (Kremlin Official Website 2018). 
The securitization narrative was more pronounced during the Olive Branch Operation as 
Turkey‘s president asserted in January 2018 that ―the YPG terrorist group has released Daesh 
members to fight against us [Turkey]. What difference does that make? They are all the same 
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[…] "Turkey will first exterminate the terrorists in Afrin and then make the region liveable 
again‖ (Daily Sabah 2018). 
  The general significance of all the four developments and the discursive 
representations of the Syrian conflict cited above is that they point to the internal dimensions 
of threat construction and otherization, thus securitization, in relations to the Kurdish issue. If 
we perceive, as Bourbeau does, that securitization is ―the process of integrating an issue into 
a security framework that emphasizes policing and defense‖ (Bourbeau 2014: 187) the AKP‘s 
approach toward the Kurdish issue as an indispensable part of the Syrian conflict embodied 
all aspects of a full-fledged securitization. The AKP government served as a prime example 
of an imprudent securitizing actor willing to go extra mile to defend the threatened ―Self‖ 
against the threatening ―Other‖ – the latter often framed in state-owned media outlets in terms 
of the evil trio of PKK-PYD-Assad (Adısönmez 2016: 629-635). Linked to this argument is 
that for Turkey removing Assad from power could help the country gain more leverage in 
dealing with or even possibly eliminating the threat of Kurdish mobilization/statehood along 
its borders. Hence, the volte-face in Turkish foreign policy since the onset of the Syrian 
revolt had external dimension as well. As previously mentioned, the geopolitical power 
struggle among Turkey, Iran, and Russia at the time in tandem with Ankara‘s lofty ambition 
to bring the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in power informed the external aspect of the 
securitization policy toward Syria. 
 
The external dimension: Ikhwan ideology and Turkey-Iran-Russia nexus 
 
As one scholar has noted, foreign policy serves as ―a medium for politicians to propose 
idealized national/state identities and thereby to define their own identities‖ (Kirdiş 2015: 
181). Therefore, foreign policy making and identity construction are mutually constitutive. 
When a state engages in the process of (re)constructing certain identities, it literally creates 
difference and thus an ―other‖ (ibid: 178-194). According to Buzan and Hansen, the state, in 
its quest for security, needs ―the threatening Other to define its identity, thereby acquiring 
ontological security‖ (Buzan and Hansen 2012: 218). What can be culled from the preceding 
arguments is two-fold. First, for reasons explained previously, the Kurdish 
mobilization/nationalism constitutes the threatening Other for Turkey at both national and 
regional levels. Second, when it comes to the external dimensions of Turkey‘s securitization 
approach toward the Syrian conflict, attention must be paid to the AKP elites‘ evocation of 
friend-enemy discourse and the ―us‖ versus ―them‖ mentality which was evident following 
the Arab Uprisings events. Although Davutoğlu‘s Strategic Depth doctrine was predicated on 
the principle of ―zero problems with neighbors,‖ the perilous turn of events in North Africa 
and later on in Syria challenged the AKP elite‘s untested idealism and pushed them to side 
with certain political parties like the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, by virtue of forging a 
regional alliance with Qatar and backing both the Syrian National Council and the Free 
Syrian Army, Turkey openly called for the ouster of the ―enemy‖ Assad, and replacing the 
Syrian ruling Ba‘ath Party with the ―friendly‖ Muslim Brotherhood.  
The high-water mark in Turkey‘s relentless support of the Ikhwan movement came on 
July 3, 2013 when President Mohamed Morsi was toppled in a Saudi-backed military coup 
orchestrated by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. "For me, Morsi is Egypt's president, not Sisi", 
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stated Erdoğan while labelling the coup as ―unacceptable‖ (Bekdil 2017). Ankara‘s support 
of Muslim Brotherhood was also evident in Erdoğan‘s adoption of the four-finger "Rabia" 
salute as a symbol of solidarity with the movement‘s sympathizers (Reuters 2017). 
Regardless of the symbolic gesture, the initial assumption among the AKP elites was that the 
Muslim Brotherhood, whether in Syria or elsewhere, could best represent Turkey‘s model of 
democracy, Islam, and free-market economy. The othering discourse used by Erdoğan was 
grounded in this ambitious view, according to which the AKP government was projected as 
being democratic, humanitarian, and progressive whereas Syrian regime was framed as being 
despotic, murderous, and retrogressive. Therefore, Ankara saw the Turkish model as a viable 
alternative for the post-Assad Syria. If successfully applied, the model could afford the AKP 
a rare opportunity to eliminate Turkey‘s long-standing security concerns, namely the Kurdish 
mobilization along Syrian border, the PKK‘s terrorist activities, and Iran‘s growing influence 
in the region. Such an othering discourse, as Milliken observes, seeks to advance ―a particular 
`regime of truth` while excluding other possible modes of identity and action‖ (Milliken 
1999: 229). The Iranian model of theocracy was evidently the last thing the AKP elites 
wanted for a post-Assad Syria. Nor was it desirable for Turkish authorities to tolerate a 
Saudi-backed general in the mold of al-Sisi. Hence, Ankara promoted and lobbied for a 
Libya-style humanitarian intervention by NATO to topple Assad. But the initial normative 
struggle between Turkey and Syria quickly turned into an all-out geopolitical rivalry as seen 
by the ongoing proxy war in Syria between Russia, Iran, and Turkey and other major regional 
players. 
Seven years into the conflict, Turkey‘s deep-seated security concerns have reached 
fever pitch. The US support of PKK-linked YPG forces and the fear of an expanding Rojava 
aided and abetted by external powers have only exasperated Turkey ―ontological insecurities‖ 
(Kinnvall 2004: 741-67; Steele 2008). This is predominantly because there is an enduring 
sense of historical trauma in Turkish society, a kind of trauma which stems from the Turkish 
collective memory of the malicious intentions and hypocritical deeds of Dış Mihraklar 
(external powers). Such perception of the disingenuous intentions and behaviours of the 
Other has been a major determining factor behind the development of ―a relatively consistent 
security culture of realpolitik‖ that reigned supreme from the Ottoman era to the present 
(Karaosmanoglu 2000: 201; Aydin 2003: 166).  
In fact, the security context in which the Turkish Republic was founded was fraught 
with insecurities and recurrent feelings of dread and distrust toward the neighbouring states 
(Joobani 2016). The bitter experiences of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), World War I (1914–
1918), and the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922), and the signing of the Treaty of 
Sèvres in 1920 created a challenging physical and cognitive environment for construction of 
a stable sense of agency and continuity for Turkey in its relations with other actors. It is 
against the background of this ―perennial ‗insecurity complex‘‖ (Aydin 2003: 164) that 
Turkey on 24 August 2016 launched its Euphrates Shield Operation and later on in January 
2018 waged another war this time on the YPG-controlled canton of Afrin to disrupt the 
―terror corridor‖ in northern Syria. In fact, the ―Olive Branch‖ and the ―Euphrates Shield‖ 
operations marked the climax of Turkey‘s securitization policy toward Syria. Above all, they 
were clear aberrations from Turkey‘s traditional foreign policy of ―peaceful settlement of 
disputes‖ and ―non-military involvement‖. This is why the Strategic Depth doctrine is a myth 
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while Turkey‘s ontological insecurity manifests itself in much greater light and with much 
more tenacity in both the realms of regional and domestic politics.     
Confident of the ―success‖ of Turkey‘s military operations in northern Syria and 
buoyed up by the recent victory of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party in 
the June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections, the AKP cadre has focused more 
conveniently on using its newly-achieved zone of influence as a bargaining chip against the 
US and other key players. Turkey and the US are, as the time of writing this article, at 
loggerheads over a range of issues from the former‘s purchase of S-400 missile system to the 
latter‘s refusal to extradite US-based Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen, who is accused of 
masterminding the July 2016 failed military coup. Although the rupture in US-Turkey 
relations, which emanates partly from the same ontological insecurity considerations, has 
resulted in Ankara‘s leaning toward Russia and to a lesser extent Iran, which does not 
necessarily mean that the two NATO allies would not be able to reconcile their differences. 
Put differently, Turkey‘s securitization policy toward Syria may have cost the AKP cadre 
their ―strategic depth‖ doctrine but Turkey appears willing to use the geopolitical foothold it 
has gained in northern Syria as a bargaining chip in its talks with Washington over the fate of 
Syrian Kurds.    
 
Concluding Discussion 
 
From a vantage point, up until the breakout of the Arab Uprisings, the AKP leadership 
attempted to apply the ―Turkish model‖ narrative and its ―Strategic Depth‖ doctrine to the 
region, erroneously believing that the country‘s strong historic ties with the former Ottoman 
territories would help the ruling party materialize its hegemonic goal of advancing Turkey‘s 
soft power. As this study shows, with the recent developments brought about by the Syrian 
conflict, particularly the emergence of PKK‘s Syrian branch PYD and its military wing YPG 
as well as the fear of growing Russo-Iranian alliance, Turkey has not only departed from its 
years-old desecuritisation process towards Syria, but also abandoned its traditional ―non-
interventionist foreign policy‖.  
In light of these crucial geopolitical developments, we argue that the AKP elites have 
made a major policy mistake by turning their cooperation mind-set into pursuance of conflict 
with Assad, believing the US under the NATO aegis would allow Turkey to establish its 
desired position in the MENA region. Thus, the steady decline of the hegemonic ―Turkish 
Model‖ project resulted from complex, intertwined development involving internal and 
external securitization processes conducted by the AKP elites. Rather than transforming 
Turkey from a medium-size regional actor into a leading regional actor, within which the 
AKP might practice its new regional order in the MENA region, the AKP‘s model gradually 
collapsed in theory and practice. Building on the theoretical lenses of the Copenhagen 
School, we underscore two findings of this work in the following lines. 
First of all, we reached a conclusion that Turkey‘s securitization policy (interventionist 
approach) was primarily driven by the fear of Kurdish autonomy/the Russo-Assad-Iranian 
alliance; and bringing Muslim Brotherhood into power in Syria/consolidating Turkey‘s 
agential importance in Western security architecture. Drawing upon on these arguments, we 
conclude that Turkey‘s volte-face politics and securitization attempts towards Syria was 
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caused by Turkey‘s underestimation of the Assad regime‘s resilience and the AKP‘s 
overestimation of Davutoğlu‘s Strategic Depth doctrine. Before clashes broke out in Syria, 
the AKP elites should have predicted that it would be unwise to overlook the causes of the 
civil unrest and avoid offering myopic and imprudent solutions to such highly complex 
regional and internal dynamics.  
Secondly, seven years into the conflict, Turkey‘s involvement in the Syrian civil war 
has not only changed Ankara‘s traditional foreign policy thinking but also dramatically 
altered the way the country deals with any issues associated with its southern neighbour. The 
AKP‘s two-fold securitization policy in Syria, which was analysed from the Copenhagen 
School‘s securitization theory, bears testimony to the points mentioned above. With respect 
to the internal aspect of threat construction/otherization, the AKP policy makers implemented 
an opportunistic project of eliminating the threat of Kurdish statehood once and for all by 
removing the evil triangle of PKK-PYD-Assad, either through NATO intervention or by 
backing the rebels in Syria. It was an ambitious project which backfired due in part to the 
Russian‘s and Iranians‘ growing involvement in the Syrian crisis.  
As for the external aspect, at the height of the Arab Uprisings there was a noticeable 
sense of ―moral superiority‖ among the AKP elites who assigned the Muslim Brotherhood 
with the mission to promote their ―Turkish model‖ in MENA region, including in Syria. The 
Ikhwan ideology was framed as an ideal alternative to the Iranian theocracy and Saudi 
Arabia‘s autocracy. The time was ripe yet Assad‘s unpredictable resistance shattered the 
hopes of the Turkish government. Later on in 2016, Turkey‘s cross-border military operation 
in Syria caused the extinction of the traditional policy of non-military engagement. But more 
than anything, it exposed the ontological insecurities of Turkey. It revived and strengthened 
the Sèvres Syndrome narratives, the hidden agenda of external forces, be it PKK, the West or 
others, who are supposedly biding time to partition the country when the time comes. 
In the final analysis, the extinction of the Strategic Depth doctrine is clear. Now that 
Turkey‘s once-domestic PKK conflict has become increasingly regionalized due in part to the 
interventionist policies of the AKP, and at a time when the country grapples with economic 
malaise and deep political polarization, the future looks more uncertain. Oddly enough, 
however, the AKP has not given up on the domestic securitization of terrorist groups, 
following instead an extensive otherization and threat construction agenda especially after the 
abortive July 2016 coup of Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü (FETÖ). For now, with the rise in the 
number of terrorist groups like FETÖ and the persistent securitization of existential threats 
posed by ―enemies‖ of the New Turkey, it seems that the era of the AKP‘s consolidation of 
power at all levels of state governance has just begun. Whether or not Turkey can extricate 
itself from this pernicious domestic securitization is yet unknown. Further research on 
Turkey‘s turbulent domestic and external political strategies and constant securitization 
tendencies are direly needed to provide us with plausible answers about how the AKP could 
devise a novel and productive foreign policy approach capable of redressing the irreparable 
harms caused by the Strategic Depth philosophy. 
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Notes 
 
1. We accept the fact that Turkey‘s Northern Iraq interventions in 2007-2008 were a clear 
deviation from the self-proclaimed non-interventionist policy. However, rather than 
aiming at ―threat manufacturing‖ with ―otherization‖ processes and regime change 
through extensive military activism as we have witnessed during the Syrian Civil War, 
Turkey‘s interventions in Iraq were conducted as temporary cross-border operations 
sought to eliminate the PKK rebels escaping from the Turkish territory. Thus, Turkey‘s 
current military activism may be traced back to the Iraqi interventions in 2007-2008, but 
the leadership‘s logic is different. 
2. Among the few exceptions are the works of Okyay (2017); Daoudy (2016); Çakmak 
(2016); Weiss (2016); Karakaya Polat (2008).   
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